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Abstract 
The Irish revolutionary period of 1912-1923 helped stimulate and 
develop the political thinking and outlook of the Irish left. During 
this period, Irish socialists and labour movement activists had to frame 
responses to the movement for independence, the responses of the 
British state, the rise of unionism, and the threat of partition. There 
was consensus within the Irish left on the existence of the Irish nation, 
the need for some degree of independence and a strident opposition 
to partition. In the period prior to 1916, it did appear as though Irish 
labour was preparing itself to challenge both unionism and national-
ism for political leadership of the country as a whole. In the aftermath 
of the Easter Rising, however, the Irish left allowed the republican 
movement to monopolise leadership of the independence struggle. This 
resulted in the marginalisation of Irish Labour in the south and made 
it more difficult for activists to resist the pan-class unionist movement 
in the north.
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This paper examines socialist and labour movement political thinking 
on the national question, during the period of the Irish Revolution. It 
focuses on attitudes towards independence, imperialism, republican-
ism, partition, and unionism. There was a diversity of views within the 
Irish left on certain of these issues, particularly the relationship with 
Irish republicanism and republican organisations. For much of the time, 
it was inconsistent and hesitant on the question of how it should orien-
tate itself towards the demand for a thirty-two-county Irish republic 
and the organisations making this demand. Even within those sections 
of the left that generally supported republican aims and objectives, 
there was no real unanimity on the nature of the support to be offered. 
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Notwithstanding this, however, this paper will argue that during the 
Irish revolutionary period, all Irish left political organisations shared 
a number of ideological strands, which straddled nation and class. 
Firstly, there was the fact of the Irish nation. All operated on the basis 
that Ireland was a single nation, separate from Britain. They did not 
consider that Ireland was composed of more than one nation, and did 
not doubt the historical basis of the claim to nationhood. Secondly, as 
a nation, Ireland had the right to national self-determination. There 
was consensus that the present constitutional arrangement, of direct 
rule from London, was unsatisfactory. Opinions varied on the ques-
tion of an Irish republic, but all accepted there ought to be an Irish 
parliament in Dublin. Thirdly, there was opposition to partition. The 
Irish Left viewed partition as having a potentially catastrophic effect 
on Irish working class interests. The measure would weaken all labour 
organisations and effectively ruin any prospect of an all-Ireland labour 
movement. It was because of this that the Irish left emerged as perhaps 
the strongest source of opposition to partition. Of course none of this 
is to argue that all trade unionists in Ireland supported home rule or 
independence or opposed partition; indeed in Belfast, the majority were 
unionist and remained firmly opposed to independence. But the union-
ist position was not supported by any independent political organisation 
of Labour during the period of the Irish revolution. Those advocating 
unionism did so through the Ulster Unionist Party. The revolutionary 
years were years of great promise and achievement for Irish Labour, but 
the actual outcome of the processes represented defeat for them, one 
arguably from which they did not recover. 
Immediately prior to the period we are examining, there had been a 
struggle within the Irish labour movement, between those who accepted 
the lead of nationalist MPs such as J.P. Nannetti, and viewed the Irish 
Parliamentary Party (IPP) as the natural political vehicle for achiev-
ing social reform,1 and two stronger factions: William Walker and his 
Belfast colleagues, who were in thrall to British Labour organisationally 
and politically;2 and a socialist-republican tendency which dominated 
Dublin Trades Council (DTC) and advocated a politically independ-
ent Irish Labour movement, which would challenge nationalism and 
unionism, in pursuit of an Irish socialist republic. Key developments 
in the generation of this latter tendency were the formation of the 
ITGWU by Jim Larkin in 1909, and the return of James Connolly from 
the USA a year or so later. Larkin and Connolly were very different, in 
terms of personality and leadership style, but their political thinking 
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was remarkably similar. Both shared the same conception of the Irish 
revolution, that it was national and social. While Connolly argued 
that ‘Irish freedom’ was not compatible with ‘those insidious forms of 
economic subjection – landlord tyranny, capitalist fraud and unclean 
usury; baneful fruits of the Norman Conquest’,3 Larkin stressed that 
he not only stood for ‘freedom from political and military slavery ... but 
also from a more degraded slavery, economic or wage slavery’.4 Both 
derided the IPP as a bourgeois organisation that had ‘never represented 
the workers’,5 and that a choice between this organisation and the ‘reac-
tionaries’ of Irish unionism was ‘almost a choice between the devil and 
the deep blue sea’.6 Connolly and Larkin were also of the view that the 
Irish working class was the Irish nation, and the political task of the day 
was the formation of independent Irish labour organisations, including 
an Irish Labour Party. It was strengthened in 1912 both by the planned 
Home Rule Bill, which seemed to place on the agenda the establish-
ment of an Irish parliament, and by William Walker’s retirement from 
politics. This allowed the socialist republicans finally to sweep aside the 
combined opposition of the British labourites and IPP sympathisers. 
They also gained support from a layer of the Belfast labour move-
ment, including some of its leading figures on Belfast Trades Council. 
At the ITUC conference that year,7 congress would agree the histori-
cally significant step of forming a separate political party. Divisions 
would remain but from that point onwards those who supported Irish 
self-government and independent Irish Labour representation held the 
upper hand within the movement and were responsible for charting its 
future course.
The socialist-republican project was disrupted, however, by the 
prospect of partition, which was floated by the British government in 
early 1914. Connolly’s famous prediction that partition would generate 
a ‘carnival of reaction’ was an argument based primarily on class con-
siderations; he was concerned about the impact the measure would have 
on Irish workers and feared it would ‘destroy’ the ‘oncoming unity of 
the labour movement’.8 These class-based fears were accompanied with 
sharp attacks on what Connolly considered to be the false national-
ism of the Home Rulers who had reluctantly accepted the measure, and 
the cynicism of the Ulster Unionist bourgeoisie, who stood to benefit 
from it. Connolly predicted that in the event of a home rule plebiscite, 
the IPP leaders would soon be touring the north-east in disingenuous 
fashion, seeking to get votes against the region’s exclusion from the pro-
visions of the act: 
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[Redmond and Devlin will be] letting loose floods of oratory 
[designed to delude] the workers into forgetting the real crime, 
viz, consenting to make the unity of the Irish nation a subject to 
be decided by the votes of the most bigoted and passion-blinded 
reactionaries in these four counties where such reactionaries are in a 
majority. The betrayal is agreed upon...the vote is only a subterfuge 
to hide the grossness of the betrayal.9
Connolly’s analysis of partition is well known, but he was not alone 
in his opposition. The Irish labour movement as a whole was aware of 
the dangers posed by partition and strongly opposed it. Class interests 
were central to the thinking. For example, in March 1914, a meeting of 
the ITUC Parliamentary Committee registered its ‘dismay and anger at 
the attempt to divide Ulster from the rest of Ireland under the proposed 
amendment of the Home Rule Bill’. Partition would, the statement con-
tinued, ‘intensify the divisions ... and destroy all our hopes of uniting 
the workers of Ulster with those of Munster, Leinster, and Connaught, 
on the basis of their industrial and economic interests’.10 On 5 April, 
the unions organised a mass labour demonstration in Dublin against 
partition, describing the proposed separation of the ‘Ulster democ-
racy’ from that of the rest of Ireland as a ‘dire calamity’. This event was 
attended by labour movement activists from all over Ireland, including 
Belfast. One of the main speakers was D.R. ‘Davy’ Campbell, a former 
president, secretary and founding-member of Belfast Trades Council 
(BTC). Although not sharing his revolutionary socialism, Campbell 
was still influenced by Connolly’s ideas and the political strategy he 
had embarked upon after his move to Belfast in 1910.11 Campbell sup-
ported Connolly in his debate with Walker over the future of Labour 
organisation in Ireland and also backed the affiliation of Larkin’s 
ITGWU to the ITUC, at a time when that proposal was being resisted 
by the British-based unions.12 He believed that the trade union move-
ment in Belfast should be part of an all-Ireland labour movement and 
supported Irish independence. All of this was threatened by partition. 
In his speech at the rally, Campbell criticised Redmond for conceding 
on partition and also referred to a public meeting held by BTC a few 
days earlier, at which ‘the organised workers of Belfast ranged them-
selves with their comrades of Dublin on the side of a united Ireland’.13 
Whatever the credibility of that latter claim – as we will see below, it 
was a claim keenly contested by other trade unionists in Belfast – there 
can be no doubt that many northern Labour movement activists saw 
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partition as the worst possible outcome of the political crisis in Ireland. 
In 1914, the ITUC voted eighty-four to two against partition. There 
were around twenty northern delegates at the Congress, showing the 
degree to which they opposed the measure.14 In fact, so concerned were 
the Belfast labour leaders that, like Connolly himself, they made it clear 
that in a straight choice between further delaying home rule, or avoid-
ing partition, Irish Labour must choose the latter.15 
Opposition to partition would remain a central feature of Labour 
politics throughout the entire period of the Irish revolution. There are 
numerous examples of speeches, or resolutions, or articles in newspa-
pers, and throughout most of them, we find similar arguments – that 
Ireland is one, that partition will dismember the country, and that par-
tition is an attempt to weaken the Irish working class, by creating a 
permanent division in its ranks. A good example of this is the comment 
made by Labour councillor James Logue, at a meeting of Derry 
Corporation in the summer of 1921, which was specially convened to 
discuss partition. Logue stated that he was opposed to any division in 
the working class movement in the country and that ‘from the point of 
view of labour, Cork was essential to Belfast and Belfast to Cork. He 
argued that unity of labour was necessary to maintain even the modest 
degree of ‘elevation’ that had been achieved in working class living 
standards in recent years. Logue went onto praise the achievements of 
the trade unions in Belfast, pointing out that it was the only city in 
Ireland where any section of the working class had a forty-four-hour 
week, and that their input would be crucial in improving conditions 
throughout the south and west. He concluded by describing the divi-
sion as a false one, which had been ‘manufactured’ by a ‘small band of 
employers’ in the north.16 Logue’s belief that partition was a ruse by 
the Ulster industrialists and the British elites to head off any prospect 
of workers’ unity remained widely held in the Irish labour movement; 
indeed, at the ILPTUC conference held that same week, a leading Irish 
labour figure, Cathal O’Shannon, rubbished partition as a measure 
‘destructive to the growing power of Irish labour and an attempt to 
prevent Ulster workers from partaking of the fruits of the struggle 
against Irish landlordism and capital’.17
Partition was a serious blow to the hopes of the Irish left but worse 
was to follow when war broke out a few months later. However, if the 
First World War would serve to create a harsh political climate that 
made class-based political activity more difficult to organise, it also had 
the effect of sharpening the political thinking of the Irish left. This 
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was particularly so in relation to imperialism. Connolly and the Irish 
left clearly saw the war as an imperialist conflict. Connolly argued that 
it was a response by British imperialism to its own economic decline, 
likening its conflict with Germany to that of a ‘doddering old miser 
confronted with a lusty youth, a miser whose only hope is to purchase 
the limbs and bodies of others in order to protect her stolen proper-
ties’.18 The ILPTUC became the only western European trade union 
federation to view the war as an imperialist conflict.19 In Dublin, the 
unions were at the heart of what would eventually become a vibrant 
anti-war movement. The war exposed John Redmond’s support for the 
British Empire, his view that it was ‘an instrument of civilisation’,20 
and his long-held belief that Ireland should play a part in its adminis-
tration and maintenance. Redmond’s decision to encourage the Irish 
Volunteers to enlist in British colours and the IPP’s recruiting activi-
ties in Belfast further widened the gap between the politics of home 
rule nationalism and the politics of Irish Labour and created space for 
the anti-imperialism of the Irish Left to come to the fore. Connolly, 
in particular, repeatedly made the connection between Redmond and 
British imperialism, excoriating the IPP leader for his desire to ‘deliver 
the goods for the Empire’ in the shape of young Irish recruits to the 
British army.21 In one blistering article published in November 1915, 
Connolly noted:
Mr Redmond and his followers tell us that it is useless to struggle 
against the empire, that we should devote all our powers to the task 
of pleasing the government by services to the Empire. That we might 
win by favours what we cannot gain by struggling and that the sole 
hope of Ireland is to win reward by giving pleasure ... is a prostitute’s 
argument ... was ever a nation so beset by its enemies? Was ever a 
nation so betrayed by its friends?22
In October 1915, DTC issued a statement, stating that while it would 
not prevent those who had ‘zeal for the British Empire’ from fighting 
abroad, it was calling upon the organised workers of Ireland to join 
either the citizen army or Irish volunteers as the best way to avoid 
conscription.23 BTC also adopted an anti-war position, describing con-
scription as ‘yoke’ around the neck of all workers and calling instead for 
the ‘conscription of wealth’.24
By this stage, Connolly had become convinced of the need for a 
rising in Ireland and was secretly working to achieve that goal. Class 
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considerations were prime. To return to his metaphor, Connolly feared 
that if the ‘miser’ could purchase enough limbs of others, it might defeat 
the ‘youth’, stave off its decline and rule Ireland for another genera-
tion. That was bad enough. What made it worse was the fate awaiting 
Irish workers in such a dispensation. Connolly feared that the power of 
the British state was increasing in Ireland, threatening the hard-fought 
but precariously-held liberties of the working class.25 Newspapers were 
regularly suppressed and Liberty Hall, HQ of the ITGWU and ‘citadel 
of the Irish labour movement’ was attacked by the police.26 Added to 
this was the constant threat of conscription, which was introduced in 
Britain in January 1916, and the morale-sapping reality of economic 
conscription, where, Connolly claimed, workers were being laid off 
in order to force them to join the army.27 That Connolly saw it as an 
age of blood and iron, opening up revolutionary socialist possibilities 
was made clear in two letters he sent to Scottish socialist leader Arthur 
McManus in Glasgow in late 1915-early 1916. Only one of these letters, 
written on 23 November 1915, has survived, but it is worth re-printing 
extracts here because of the insight it offers into Connolly’s political 
thinking at this crucial stage in his life. Writing to inform McManus 
that he would be unable to accept an invitation to speak at an anti-
conscription meeting in Glasgow, Connolly stated:
Every moment in Dublin now is full of tragic possibilities as our 
beneficent Government is becoming daily more high handed in its 
methods, and my presence is required here in constant watchfulness. 
Hence with regret, I must decline your kind invitation, and send you 
instead this message to yourself and all comrades who refuse to be 
led astray to fight the battles of the ruling capitalist class. Tell them 
that we in Ireland will not have conscription, let the law say what it 
likes. We know our rulers: we know their power, and their ruthless-
ness, we experience every day. We know they can force us to fight 
whether we wish to or not, but we know also that no force in their 
possession can decide for us where we will fight. That remains for us 
to decide; and we have no intention of shedding our blood abroad for 
our masters. Rather we will elect to shed it if need be in a battle for 
the conquest of our freedom at home.28
McManus pointed out that in the second letter, written at the end of 
January 1916, but later seized by Scotland Yard after he was arrested 
in 1917, ‘the one consoling fact to [Connolly], which stood out in the 
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Government’s policies of persecution, was the potentialities of Social 
Revolution which their action developed’ and concluded that ‘Jim 
Connolly was the first socialist I had met who actually worked for the 
Revolution and dreamt of its immediate possibility!!!’.29 The import 
of these letters is clear. Connolly was convinced that the government 
was ‘becoming daily more high handed in its methods’ and in threat-
ening to introduce conscription, was driving Ireland to the point of a 
revolt which had ‘potentialities of social revolution’. With this analysis 
at hand, Connolly’s decision to rise in 1916 becomes understandable.
No Irish labour movement organisation supported Connolly’s 
actions in 1916. In Dublin, where the trades council was strongly influ-
enced by republicanism, and where Connolly had been in control of 
the ITGWU and ICA, support was not forthcoming. In Belfast, where 
the local trades council was led by activists who had been influenced 
by Connolly, there was a strong and understandable reluctance to say 
anything publicly about the Rising.30 Recent research on Irish atti-
tudes towards the rising has suggested that the shift in public opinion 
towards the republicans took place earlier than had previously been 
believed.31 In fact, the tide of public opinion may have already begun to 
turn against Redmond even before Easter 1916.32 This makes it likely 
that by the autumn of 1916, there was already a growing sympathy to 
the Rising and republicanism more generally within the labour move-
ment, at rank-and-file level. However, at leadership level, Labour was 
unwilling to take such a position. Behind this, there was an understand-
able fear of British repression, but also some clear ideological factors. In 
August 1916, at its first post-Rising gathering, the ITUCLP met at Sligo 
and adopted what Desmond Greaves described as a ‘facing both ways’ 
stance of sympathy for the dead both of Easter Week and the trenches 
of France and Belgium.33 Labour leader, Tom Johnson, went further, 
expressing his personal support for the British war effort, binding it 
to the victory of freedom the world over. This stance of Johnson was 
well in line with his political training and background. He was, as his 
biographer informs us, a socialist of ILP vintage,34 and one who shared 
many of the preconceptions within the socialist movement of his native 
England. As O’Connor pointed out, the Labour leader ‘assumed a 
tension between nationalism and socialism’ and treated Ireland’s right 
to self-determination ‘as if it were an item of foreign policy’.35 The other 
powerful figure in the leadership of Irish Labour was William O’Brien, 
the acting secretary of the ITGWU and Vice-Chairman of the Labour 
party. O’Brien was a close friend of Connolly. For reasons that were 
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initially different to those of Johnson, but which had the same ultimate 
effect, O’Brien too opted Labour out of the independence movement, 
consigning it to a position of follower rather than leader of the national 
struggle. O’Brien was influenced by Connolly’s syndicalism and he 
appreciated the socialist potentialities of industrial unionism. He had, 
as O’Connor Lysaght has pointed out, ‘learnt, with Connolly’s aid, 
that the means to their desired end was through building the workers’ 
organisations within the shell of the political state’.36 But Connolly’s 
syndicalism had been combined with the promotion of a militant class 
consciousness, designed to fire the Irish working class to the head of the 
independence movement. His basic beliefs about the dual nature of the 
Irish struggle and his own revolutionary approach were not adopted by 
O’Brien. A syndicalist without a revolutionary attitude or approach, 
O’Brien would soon become the trade union bureaucrat par excellence, 
insulated by the machinery he put in place from the rising levels of 
political and industrial militancy. 
In this period after 1916, Irish labour would become far more pow-
erful. Trade union membership rocketed,37 and many strikes and 
occupations were organised that shook the British state to its core. In 
April 1918 there was a one-day general strike against conscription; the 
year 1919 witnessed the Limerick Soviet;38 the following year saw the 
munitions railway boycott, which was perhaps the most significant and 
bitterly-fought struggle between the British state and the Irish labour 
movement throughout the entire revolutionary period;39 while in 1922 
alone there would be over eighty workplace occupations throughout 
Ireland.40 Clearly, then, Labour had many opportunities to play a 
more leading political role during this period, but two points need to 
be made in order to explain its rather toothless status in post-revolu-
tionary Ireland. Firstly, Labour did not view the national question as 
an integral feature of the political terrain in Ireland and did not frame 
its programme in accordance with this reality. Instead, it considered 
the national question as an unwelcome obstacle that needed to be over-
come, in order for normal, British-style left-right politics to develop. 
Secondly, it looked to Sinn Fein to clear away this obstacle and from 
1918 onwards, acted as a tail-end to the republican revolutionaries. As 
it made clear in the 1918 General Election, when justifying its deci-
sion to withdraw, Labour did not wish to challenge Sinn Fein’s claim to 
speak for the Irish nation. The party supported Irish independence, but 
never put this to the fore of its programme, preferring to focus on social 
and economic issues, which it considered to be separate to the national 
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question. Congress never recognised Dáil Éireann, being fearful that 
such a move might invite British repression and threaten the unity of 
trade unionism in the north. But it made it equally clear that it would 
not be taking part in any struggle for political leadership in Ireland, for 
the duration of the Irish revolution. 
The post-1918 revolutionary left adopted a different stance in relation 
to the national independence struggle. This section of the left moved 
through different phases and for a period was controlled by some of the 
same leaders who wielded power within the broader Irish labour move-
ment. But in October 1921, it eventually took on a new organisational 
form and became the first Communist Party of Ireland (CPI). The 
political ideology of the CPI was Connollyite, which was perhaps not 
surprising, given the prominent role played in this party by Connolly’s 
son, Roddy. But aspects of Irish communist political thinking were also 
innovative, in that they applied these ideas to a political context very 
different to that which had obtained during James Connolly’s life. This 
was especially the case in relation to the Treaty. The CPI was the first 
political organisation to oppose the Treaty, describing it as a ‘hollow 
mockery of freedom’ and predicting ‘civil war and social hell’ if it was 
accepted.41 In two lengthy articles, which were carried over several edi-
tions of the Workers Republic during 1922-1923,42 Connolly depicted the 
Free State as a ‘puppet’ state of British imperialism. The social base of 
the state was the upper stratum of the Irish bourgeoisie, a class that was 
too weak to defeat the British but one that was ‘interested in imperialist 
exploitation of the Dominions, India, the Far East etc., and tied by divi-
dend coupons to the fortunes of the British Empire’.43 The departure of 
the nationalist stratum of the Irish bourgeoisie from the revolutionary 
movement into what was effectively an alliance with the British and 
the unionists had sabotaged the republican movement and strengthened 
British rule throughout Ireland. The context in which the CPI placed 
the Treaty was inspired also by Russian Bolshevism. It believed the 
British empire to be ‘rocking’, and predicted it would be ‘broken and 
crushed in India, and destroyed in Egypt’. The Comintern analysis, of 
an impending war between the USA and Britain was invoked, and it 
would be as a pawn of imperialism that Irish Free State would now be 
placed. The pro-Treaty section of the IRA would become the ‘watch-
dog’ of the English capitalists, helping to ‘enslave millions under the 
Union Jack’.44 I have argued previously that the political ideology of 
the first CPI not only informed the outlook of the socialist republican 
IRA in the late 1920s-early 1930s, but can also be regarded as an early 
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contribution to the development of what would become the Marxist 
theory of neo-colonialism.45 However, if the analysis of the CPI was 
very different to that of the ILPTUC, the party also found the question 
of how it should relate to republicanism troublesome and divisive. For 
much of its short history, CPI political strategy was based on an accept-
ance of republican leadership of the national struggle. Partly as a result 
of its own analysis of the IRA as potentially a proletarian army, partly 
at the behest of the Comintern, which wanted a broad, anti-imperialist 
front established in Ireland, in order to upset and weaken the power 
of its most aggressive enemy,46 and partly in recognition of its own 
tiny nature, the CPI would subordinate itself to the IRA, and, unlike 
Labour, would later support it during the civil war, joining the fighting 
itself, before its eventual dissolution by the Comintern as an organisa-
tion in 1924.47 But this subordination was divisive and arguments for a 
more independent class-based strategy were also repeatedly made. All 
Irish communists accepted the need for an orientation towards the anti-
Treaty IRA; precisely how close they should get to the republicans was 
always the devil in that particular detail. 
For very different reasons then, the Irish Marxists and the social 
democrats both supported Irish self-determination and accepted that 
this particular struggle should be led by republicans. They had differ-
ent conceptions of what constituted freedom in Ireland, but were both 
of the view that republicans would provide the spearhead and much 
of the muscle in the struggle against British rule. Another aspect of 
political thinking they had in common was their analysis of unionism 
and loyalism. Both regarded unionism simply as a reactionary ideology, 
disseminated from above by the orange capitalists, supported by the 
British, and designed to prevent protestant workers from unifying with 
their catholic counterparts. Arguably, this apparent lack of understand-
ing of unionism and Labour’s subordination to Sinn Fein would have 
implications for the future of the labour movement in the north, and it 
is to labour in the north, specifically Belfast that I now want to turn. 
Competing ideologies were in evidence within Belfast trade union-
ism during this period. There was a minority section that aligned itself 
with the rest of the Irish labour movement. This faction was composed 
mainly of protestant activists, many of whom were part of BTC, and 
the Belfast Labour Party, which was formed by the trades council and 
remnants from the old Independent Labour Party branches in 1918. As 
we have noted above, these activists had been influenced to a degree 
by Connolly. Their main concern in this period was partition and they 
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were active in organising meetings and events designed to highlight the 
dangers the measure posed to working class interests all over the country. 
The Belfast labour activists also remained opposed to conscription and 
in 1918 BTC endorsed a resolution passed by Bradford Trades Council, 
which described conscription in Ireland as a ‘monstrous injustice’.48 
They were central to the organising of two anti-conscription meetings 
in Belfast in April of that year, the second of which was broken up 
by large crowds of loyalists.49 The national question posed them more 
difficulties and was dealt with in a cautious fashion. D.R. Campbell 
sought to distance Labour from Sinn Fein but did indicate publicly that 
a solution might be found on the basis of dominion home rule in an 
unpartitioned Ireland. He did not feel that it would be possible to move 
beyond this position at that point in Belfast. That this appeared to be 
the view of some of the other northern labour leaders could be seen in 
1917, when Belfast Trades Council was part of a wider Belfast Labour 
delegation to the Irish Convention, established by Horace Plunkett. 
The majority of this delegation, which including some who would later 
stand in elections for Belfast Labour, signed a statement which advo-
cated such a political dispensation.50
The Belfast socialists generally maintained this position thereaf-
ter. There was concern at Labour’s deference towards Sinn Fein in the 
south. The party’s decision to withdraw from the 1918 general election 
was criticised by northern activists. Campbell, for example, rejected the 
leadership’s view that a peace-time election was in any way different to 
a war-time one, while other Belfast delegates expressed their disbelief 
that a Labour body would lie down to Sinn Fein in this fashion.51 As 
the election drew near, Belfast Labour Party decided to act and eventu-
ally candidates were ran in four strongly unionist wards – Pottinger, 
Victoria, Shankill and Cromac. In their pre-election meetings, the 
candidates focused mainly on social and economic questions. For 
example, they called for the extension of the medical benefits of the 
National Insurance Act to Ireland and also made the case for a 41-hour 
working week. With this latter demand, they were tapping into a griev-
ance that would soon precipitate a general strike in the city. The party 
also took a strong anti-war position, which was a courageous stance to 
adopt in Belfast. At one meeting, Sam Kyle pointed out how ‘twenty 
men in Europe had made twenty million homes desolate’ and that the 
same thing would happen again ‘unless there was a federation of the 
working classes’.52 There was a reluctance to engage in discussions on 
the national question. At one pre-election meeting, Labour candidate, 
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James Freeland was asked his views ‘on the Union’. Freeland deflected 
the question with humour, saying that as far as he was aware the (poor 
law) Union was situated on the Lisburn Road and that he hoped it 
‘would soon disappear’.53 At the same time, however, at least three of 
the four Labour candidates were known to be pro-independence. The 
unionist press reminded its readers that one of four, Robert Waugh, 
had been part of the Labour delegation that ‘had signed a Home Rule 
declaration at the recent Irish Convention’.54 Another of the candi-
dates, Samuel Porter, who stood for Labour in the Pottinger ward, 
made his own views clear. In language that showed the influence of 
recent international events on the discourses around Irish independ-
ence, Porter called for the ‘the fullest measure of self-government, in 
accordance with the principle of self-determination of nations, as laid 
down by President Wilson and accepted by the Allies’.55 Sam Kyle, who 
stood for Labour in the Shankill and was probably the best known of all 
the candidates, had previously stated his support for an Irish workers’ 
republic.56 Labour won no seats at this election, but they did receive 
an impressive average twenty-two per cent of the vote across the four 
seats, and over 12,000 votes in total. It would be wrong to claim this as 
evidence that a significant section of the protestant working class were 
accepting of Irish independence, but it does show quite clearly that they 
were not all behind the Ulster Unionist Party. Several of these Belfast 
socialists would soon be involved in the famous forty-four-hours strike 
of January 1919. This included strike leader, Charles McKay, who had 
also been a signatory to the Irish Convention report. A few months 
later, they organised the biggest May-Day workers’ demonstration in 
the city’s history, involving over 100,000 people. The high-point of 
Belfast Labour was reached the following January, at the corporation 
elections, when twelve candidates were elected after receiving 17,000 
first-preference votes. This made Labour the official opposition to the 
unionists and led directly to the latter abolishing proportional repre-
sentation for local elections, in order to prevent a repeat occurrence. 
Thereafter Belfast Labour toiled in a complex political situation of 
rising unemployment, constitutional crisis, revolution and lethal sec-
tarian violence. The major set-back of this period was the expulsion of 
around 5,500 catholic workers and 1,850 protestant trade unionists from 
their workplaces, which was accompanied with weeks of street rioting 
and murders.57 These expulsions were fomented by loyalist groups, 
including the Belfast Protestant Association and the Ulster Unionist 
Labour Association. The Belfast socialists understood the expulsions 
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not simply as acts of extreme anti-catholic violence, but as an attack on 
their own organisations and progressive socialist ideas generally. They 
believed that the violence had been orchestrated by the unionist leaders, 
with the aim of wrecking the prospects of workers’ unity that had 
begun to develop in the 1919-20 period. This can be seen in the appeal 
which accompanied the establishment of an expelled workers fund in 
August 1920. It was noted here that the expulsions had not been carried 
out by ordinary workers, but by backward elements whose ‘religious 
and political rancour’ made them ‘ready instruments’ for the stirring of 
sectarian hatreds. ‘But the wire pulling and the instigation’ the appeal 
continued, ‘were the work of a political and capitalistic caucus who 
sought to break up the ranks of Labour. Their plan was the ol d one: 
Divide and Conquer’.58 In the months that followed the expulsions, 
many of the Belfast labour leaders were involved in expelled workers 
relief fund activity. They spoke at numerous trade union meetings in 
Ireland and especially Britain, in an unsuccessful attempt to secure the 
meaningful backing of the British TUC for the expelled workers. Their 
analysis of the expulsions did not change. For example, James Baird, 
a member of the boilermakers’ society, and prominent Belfast Labour 
councillor offered the following comments at the 1921 British TUC 
conference:
Every man who was prominently known in the Labour movement, 
who was known as an ILPer, was expelled from his work just the same 
as the rebel Sinn Feiners. To show their love of the ILP, they burnt 
our hall in North Belfast. The Chairman of our Central branch had 
to flee to Glasgow for his life. The secretary had to fly all the way to 
London. The district chairman of the AEU, a very quiet and moder-
ate Labour man was beaten not once but two or three times because 
he persisted in returning to his work. A member of the executive of 
the joiners society was also expelled. He was not a catholic and was 
also a moderate Labour man.59
 
At a meeting in South London later in the year, two campaigners, one of 
whom was the prominent ex-orangeman turned socialist, John Hanna, 
were quoted by the Belfast News Letter as saying that that they had been 
driven from their jobs because they supported an Irish Republic, and 
that they would not be satisfied until such a republic was established.60
Between July 1920 and July 1922, 453 people were killed in Belfast 
and around 23,000 of the city’s 93,000 Catholics were forced out of 
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their homes.61 Belfast Labour could not function in this environment 
and decided not to stand in the inaugural Northern Ireland Parliament 
elections in 1921. Four independent Labour candidates did run, but 
were physically prevented from holding meetings. The best-known 
example of this took place at the Ulster Hall on 17 May, when a group 
of loyalists headed by the Ulster Ex-Servicemen’s Association and 
the British Empire Union attacked a meeting planned by three of the 
four candidates, Baird, Hanna, and Harry Midgley. Notwithstanding 
these difficulties, during the election, the Labour candidates remained 
supportive of Irish independence and Irish unity and continued to rep-
resent partition as a sectarian ruse concocted by the Unionist leaders 
to gain political support: ‘We are completely against partition. It is an 
unworkable stupidity, as the inner circle of wire-pullers well know, but 
it is considered good enough to fight an election on ... the interests of 
the workers of Ireland are politically and economically one’.62 
However, the socialists associated with Belfast Trades Council and 
the Belfast Labour Party were a minority voice within Belfast trade 
unionism. Throughout the revolutionary period, they would be opposed 
by a labour unionism that was ideologically, and in the political field 
organisationally, indistinguishable from mainstream Ulster Unionism. 
Previous manifestations of labour unionism had taken place through 
the medium of independent orangeism and had been more autonomous 
and troublesome for the unionist elites, especially during the period of 
Tory ‘constructive unionism’ at the turn of the century. However the 
emergence of the unionists from the shadow of the Conservative Party 
and the forging of a stronger and more cohesive pan-class alliance in the 
years following the formation of the Ulster Unionist Council in 1905 
had neutralised independent orangeism, stripping away its autonomy, 
strengthening the control of the Ulster Unionist leaders and official 
Orange Order.63 During the revolutionary period, there would be 
several highpoints of labour unionist activity. In 1912, the first round 
of expulsions of catholic workers and protestant trade unionists was 
accompanied with the establishment of unionist working men’s clubs 
in the Belfast shipyards and engineering shops. In April 1914, a mass 
meeting of several thousand protestant workers took place at the Ulster 
Hall, expressing opposition to home rule and repudiating the political 
leadership of the local trades council. Labour unionism was institu-
tionalised in 1918 into two bogus labour organisations, the Ulster 
Unionist Labour Association, (UULA) and the Ulster Workers Union, 
(UWU) – the former was a clear attempt at formalising hegemony over 
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the protestant working class by Edward Carson, while the latter was an 
attempt by a well-known labour unionist, James Turkington, to estab-
lish a sectarian rival to the ITGWU. Again, in 1920, labour unionism 
played a central role during the larger and more politically significant 
round of workplace expulsions. 
Labour unionist political thinking had a number of features. It dis-
puted the right of organisations such as BTC to speak for protestant 
workers; for example at a meeting in 1914, Turkington claimed that 
BTC represented only one-fifth of Belfast trade unionists and was 
the ‘tool of the socialist home rulers and puppet of the United Irish 
League’.64 The ideology was class collaborationist and imperialist. 
At one pre-election meeting in Strandtown Unionist Club in Belfast 
in 1918, UULA candidate Thompson Donald reflected warmly on 
the ‘wonderful assistance’ that ‘our colonies’ had given the ‘mother 
country in her hour of need’, and how they must be accorded their 
share of representation in the future when imperial matters were being 
discussed. Donald stressed that ‘Ulster’ must never in the future allow 
any measure that was calculated to benefit the community be limited to 
Scotland, England and Wales.65 A few days earlier, the same speaker had 
praised shipyard owner Frank Workman as an ‘admirable employer’, 
before expressing his ‘abhorrence’ at strikes and his belief that ‘labour 
and capital should go hand in hand’.66 Three years later, in the run-up 
to the Belfast Parliament elections, a well-known labour unionist and 
shipwright, William Grant, criticised independent Labour candidates 
for attempting to split the protestant electorate, assuring protestant 
voters that their interests would be best served by the four unionist 
candidates, because they were evenly selected from the ranks of capital 
and labour.67 
Labour unionism did have something of a material basis. It rested on 
a reading of the uneven development of the Irish economy, the perceived 
social and economic interests of the protestant working class and the 
dependent relationship of the Belfast economy to the British economy. 
For example, at the Ulster Hall rally in 1914, there were references to 
how Home Rule would rob protestant workers of the protection of a 
parliament, under which Belfast had become one of the most prosper-
ous and important manufacturing and commercial cities of the empire 
and place it in the hands of protectionists and agriculturalists who did 
not understand and would be indifferent to Ulster’s industrial pro-
gress.68 Edward Carson in particular tended to stress this particular 
threat when addressing labour unionist gatherings. On occasion, he 
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could go as far as to warn protestant workers that the rights and ben-
efits and improvements they had obtained as part of the British labour 
movement (rarely supported by the Ulster Unionists, it has to be said!) 
would perish under home rule.69
In keeping with unionist and conservative discourses more gener-
ally,70 the labour unionists also tended to present republicanism and 
communism as one and the same. But they went further and connected 
this to their labour opponents in Belfast. During the 1921 Northern 
Ireland parliament elections, West Belfast UULA candidate, Harry 
Burn, dismissed his Labour Party rival, John Hanna, as a ‘Bolshevist’, 
arguing that ‘unionist Labour was quite capable of representing the 
unionist working men and women better than any socialist or any 
of those who stood for an unpartitioned Ireland’. In North Belfast, 
William Grant argued that there was an alliance between Belfast labour 
and Sinn Fein, ‘that the Bolshevik movement and Sinn Fein were one’ 
and that they had allied to ‘cause trouble to unionism in Belfast’.71 In 
East Belfast, Thompson Donald pointed out how he had been opposed 
in that constituency by a combined force of ‘Sinn Feiners and Red flag-
gers’ but vowed that unionism would ‘fight to the finish’ against them.72 
Unionism continued to exert a strong grip over the protestant working 
class. There was no appetite for the weak, Ulster-only trade unionism 
advocated by Turkington’s UWU, but this was not surprising, given the 
manner in which that organisation was used by employers to introduce 
scab labour and weaken bona-fide trade union organisation.73 Trade 
unionism within the shipbuilding and engineering industries remained 
British in organisation and unionist in political outlook. Most branches 
of those unions were not affiliated to the local trades council. In May 
1918, a deputation travelled to London, to express the opposition of 
protestant trade unionists to home rule. A large meeting of Belfast 
workers was duly held shortly afterwards which expressed support for 
this ‘most emphatic protest’ against home rule. In another sign of the 
divides within the Belfast working class, this particular meeting went 
onto strongly endorse conscription, calling for its immediate introduc-
tion in Ireland.74 But labour unionist ideology throughout this period 
remained indistinguishable from that of Ulster unionism. There was 
never any critique of the social policies of the Ulster Unionists, and 
no attempt even to resurrect William Walker’s effort at a politically 
independent labour unionism of many years earlier. Instead, it would 
remain part of the unionist bloc, under the control of the unionist 
leaders. Labour unionism and the UULA had mixed fortunes during 
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these years but would ultimately play a significant role in the formation 
and consolidation of the state of Northern Ireland; the UULA did well 
in the 1918 election, returning three MPs in Belfast. It was unable to 
wield any influence during the time of the 1919 Belfast strike and was 
eclipsed by the Belfast Labour Party in the 1920 corporation elections. 
However, later in 1920, the association was instrumental to the work-
place expulsions. As Morgan pointed out, these expulsions would in 
turn prove crucial to the emergence of a protestant political economy; 
a loyalist industrial order; and the purging of the existing trade union 
leadership – processes that simply overwhelmed the Belfast labour 
movement, solidified pan-class unionism and strengthened those in 
control of the new Northern Ireland state.75
In conclusion, this analysis of socialist and labour movement politi-
cal thinking in Ireland reveals a pre-1916 movement that was preparing 
itself as a challenger to both nationalism and unionism for political lead-
ership in Ireland, and a post-1916 movement that quite clearly did not. 
The removal of Connolly and Larkin from the leadership of Irish labour 
led to the development of a new political strategy, based on different 
political thinking. Post-1916 socialists had difficulty in engaging with 
the question of Irish independence and the sudden emergence of a mass-
based republican movement. They saw the national question as one that 
only republicans could solve and in so doing, they gave up their hopes of 
political leadership without a struggle. The Irish Labour party’s uncriti-
cal support for Irish nationalism and its subordination to Sinn Fein also 
made it more difficult for the admittedly far weaker movement in the 
north to resist the structural processes that were underway, and which 
would result in the partition of the island; a permanent division in the 
working class; the temporary destruction of labour politics in Belfast; 
and the triumph of a yellow variant, which would wield significant, if 
also temporary, power during the latter period of the Irish revolution. 
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